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Despite characterisation of Iran as an ideologically-driven state, 
expansionist and dominated by Islamic extremism, conventional interests-
based pragmatism has been an important element in Iran’s foreign 
policy, and has often been dominant. Without being uncritical of the 
Islamic republic, this article explores the ways that revolutionary, 
pragmatic and nationalist principles have influenced her foreign policy, 
and concludes that even the revolutionary principle may not necessarily 
or always be as inimical to the prevailing international system as is 
sometimes supposed. 
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Assertions in the media or by politicians that Iran has or has had an 
expansionist, hegemonic or ideological foreign policy, aimed at 
destabilising or dominating the immediate region around her borders, are 
common. Such assertions are particularly common from states along the 
southern shore of the Persian Gulf, from some other Arab states 
dominated by Sunni elites, and from some sectors of opinion in Israel and 
the United States. But are such views justified by the observable reality of 
Iran’s behaviour in her relations with her neighbours, and more distant 
states?  Can we identify some consistent patterns in that behaviour, that 
might permit general analytical statements or even predictions about 
Iran’s likely future behaviour? Or is Iran’s foreign policy quixotic, 
random; the product of radical politics, religious zealotry and inscrutable 
internal political pressures and therefore dangerously unpredictable (as is 
also sometimes suggested)? 
 
In this piece I suggest that this is not the case, and that Iran is not the 
dangerous wild card in the region, as she is sometimes portrayed. I 
believe that there are three discernible principles at work in Iran’s foreign 
policy, corresponding in part to specific internal political forces; a 
revolutionary principle, a pragmatic principle, and a nationalist principle. 
Specific foreign policy statements or initiatives may draw upon one or 
two of these, but only relatively rarely upon all three.
1
 
 
Advocating direct, comprehensive talks between the US and Iran in 2008, 
Henry Kissenger said Iran had to decide ‘whether it is a nation or a cause. 
If Iran thinks of itself as a nation or can be brought to do so, it can be 
accorded a respected place in the international system’2 This is a 
characteristically grand Kissenger statement, taking for granted the ability 
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of the US and her allies to decide who is or is not accorded a place in the 
international system (an ability that may not forever be what it was in his 
heyday). But it contains another, related assumption; Iran may have to 
abandon her cause in order to become respectable, but the cause with 
which the United States is identified is unquestionable and is indeed part 
of the structure of international relations itself. 
 
This presents us with the idea of nations or states as causes. 
Revolutionary states have often framed their foreign policy as reflecting a 
cause or a revolutionary purpose in the world, aiming at a transformation 
of one or many aspects of the world beyond their borders.  This purpose 
may be portrayed as such largely for presentational purposes; it may 
outlive in its presentational function the motivational function with which 
it began, and the relative importance of the presentational and the 
motivational may be much debated in any given case. But the sense of a 
cause or revolutionary purpose was plain, for example, in the conduct of 
revolutionary France in the period 1789-1799, and indeed afterwards too.  
It was marked by the removal of aristocratic titles and privileges in 
conquered territory, the expropriation of religious property, and symbolic 
acts like the erection of trees of liberty in market squares. Later, in an 
extension of the same spirit, the French imposed the Code Napoleon; an 
enduring influence on legal arrangements in many European countries. 
 
The former Soviet Union, another revolutionary state, stood also for the 
propagation of a revolutionary principle in the world; and although that 
principle lay in abeyance in the 1930s in the period of ‘Socialism in One 
Country’ it was applied later, with the extension of the Soviet communist 
system to the countries of eastern Europe, after the victory of the Soviet 
red army over Nazism. But in both the French and the Soviet cases, the 
original cause eventually became largely a figleaf for exploitation, 
oppression and the exercise of hegemony. 
 
It is sometimes overlooked in this context that the United States 
originated with a revolution, and can therefore also be seen as a 
revolutionary state. Leaving aside the questions of how or to what extent 
that can still be said to be true nearly two and a half centuries later, or that 
of how much the US has had in common with those other revolutionary 
states, it is nonetheless clear that, like them, and perhaps rather more 
consistently, the US has represented a cause in its foreign policy – the 
cause of democracy, political freedom and national self-determination – 
especially since the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson 1913-21, and above 
all since 1945. 
 
So perhaps it is less that Iran is a cause – more that Iran’s cause is 
perceived to conflict with the US cause.  But is that conflict intrinsic, 
necessary or inevitable? 
 
At the time of the revolution, and since, Iran too has stood for certain 
ideas in its foreign policy – ideas connected with the Islamic ideology of 
the 1979 revolution, including a defence and assertion of Islam 
(especially Shi‘a Islam), anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, and an anti-
Israeli position (viewing Israel as an illegitimate, Zionist entity 
established by or with the connivance of imperialist powers, to the 
detriment of Islam, within the traditional territory of Islam and resulting 
in the displacement and persecution of Muslim Palestinians). Some of 
these ideas appeared in the new constitution established by the Islamic 
republic (and approved by popular vote in a referendum) in 1979. One 
significant provision included a mention in the Preamble to the 
Constitution that the Revolutionary Guard would be responsible inter alia 
for ‘fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God’s path; that is, 
extending the sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.’– and 
again in Article 10 – 
 
 ‘In accordance with the verse: “This your nation is a single nation, and I 
am your Lord, so worship Me,” all Muslims form a single nation, and the 
government of the Islamic republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its 
general policies with a view to the merging and union of all Muslim 
peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, 
economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world’3 
 
This could be, and has been, interpreted to signify a mission to spread the 
revolution to other Islamic countries. Especially in the time of Khomeini, 
the foreign policy field was fruitful for the production of revolutionary 
neologisms and clichés (many of the terms were first used by Khomeini 
himself). Imperialism was javan-khor (world-devouring) – the United 
States was shaytan-e bozorg or estekbar-e jahani (the great satan, or  
world arrogance).  It produced a jargon of stridency and intransigence. 
 
These features, of strident revolutionary rhetoric linked to an 
ideologically driven foreign policy, were prominent in several events of 
the early years after the revolution, especially in 1979-82. One example is 
the occupation of the US embassy in November 1979 and the ensuing 
hostage crisis, which has had a deep effect on US attitudes to Iran down 
to the present day. Another is the campaign of vilification against the 
Baathist regime of Iraq in the first half of 1980, part of which was 
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exhortation to the Iraqi Shi‘a population to rise up in revolt. Some4 have 
suggested that this campaign of destabilization left Saddam Husein with 
no choice but to invade Iran in a preemptive strike in September 1980. 
This is a misleading exaggeration; there were other more important 
causes for the war,
5
 and Saddam has to bear the prime responsibility, but 
Iranian revolutionary rhetoric was certainly significant as a contributory 
factor in raising tensions. A third example was the establishment of 
Hezbollah with Iranian help in Lebanon in the early 1980s; an action 
which sprang from fellow-feeling with the Arab Shi‘as of the southern 
Lebanon at the time of the Israeli invasion of June 1982, but which has 
developed over the years into a strategic alliance against Israel,
6
 and is 
today probably the single most important active instance of ideologically-
driven foreign policy. 
 
Various personalities and groups over the years were associated with 
Iran’s involvement in Lebanon, but the most consistent have been the 
Qods Force of the Sepah-e Pasdaran, the Revolutionary Guards Corps. In 
general, this unit is the one identified and tasked with those 
responsibilities set out in the parts of the constitution mentioned already 
above.  
 
From the beginning however there was also a pragmatic strand in Iranian 
foreign policy; sometimes in conflict with the revolutionary principle, 
and sometimes eclipsed by it.  So for example, in the time of the 
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Provisional Government in 1979, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan 
conducted talks with the United States (at the beginning of November, in 
Algiers) aimed at the resolution of disputes over arms contracts left over 
from the time of the Shah, but also other matters.  These talks were 
heavily criticized by leftist groups at the time, and that criticism 
contributed to the febrile atmosphere of the autumn of 1979 that 
culminated in the occupation of the US embassy, which in turn led to the 
resignation of Bazargan. Pragmatism (one could call it the tradition of 
interests-based diplomacy) was pushed out by the revolutionary principle.  
One of the most strident advocates for the revolutionary principle (and 
particularly of support for Lebanese Hezbollah) in the first half of the 
1980s was Hosein-Ali Montazeri, who at that time was expected to be 
Khomeini’s successor. But within a short time after the outbreak of the 
Iran-Iraq war, pragmatism began to reassert itself. In 1986 the two 
principles came into conflict in the Iran-Contra episode. There is not 
space here to go into the detail of Iran-Contra, but from the Iranian point 
of view the essence of it was that it was an exercise in realpolitik, aimed 
at the acquisition of vital high-technology weapons and weapons spares 
at a time when the country was under desperate pressure in the war with 
Iraq. In return the Iranians used their influence in Lebanon, via 
Hezbollah, to bring about the release of Western hostages held there. To 
secure a deal on weapons supplies, Iran was prepared to do a covert deal 
with the US, and accept deliveries from Israel (in fact arms deliveries 
from Israel appear to have been going on for several years even before 
the Iran-Contra talks began
7
). The deal flew in the face of revolutionary 
ideology, but was a pragmatic necessity in wartime. It was managed by 
the arch-pragmatist within the Iranian system, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and 
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one can see the greater emphasis on pragmatism through the war 
(culminating in the decision to accept a ceasefire and end it) as closely 
related to the rising influence of Rafsanjani within the Iranian system 
over the same period. As the pragmatic principle waxed, so the position 
of Montazeri waned. Given the extreme political incorrectness of many 
aspects of the Iran-Contra episode, one might have expected there to be a 
brutal reckoning after it became public; but in fact the only casualty was 
Mehdi Hashemi, a close associate of Montazeri and an enthusiast for 
contacts with Lebanese Hezbollah, who had been responsible for making 
the scandal public by leaking details of it to a Lebanese newspaper. 
Mehdi Hashemi was executed after a period of custody and 
interrogation.
8
 Eventually, in 1989, Montazeri was removed from his 
position as successor; the Mehdi Hashemi affair had been important in his 
slide out of favour. 
9
 
 
Significant also in the story of pragmatism during the Iran-Iraq war was 
the origin of Iran’s alliance with Syria. Again, one might not think the 
Assads’ regime in Syria would be a natural ally, given the aggressively 
secular and Arab nationalist origins of their Baathist regime. But (along 
with Israel, perhaps) they were Iran’s best allies in the 1980s, and have 
continued so to this day. Beyond the straightforward alliance between the 
two states, based initially on hostility to Saddam’s Iraq, Syria has been 
important to Iran as a link to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It has been strongly 
in the Iranian state’s interest to continue to support the Syrian regime, 
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 Montazeri later, after 1997, became a stern critic of the Islamic regime and an 
inspiration for the reformist movement in Iran, but that is another story 
even after the mass insurrection since the beginning of 2011; and wider 
world opinion, having been critical of Iran’s support initially, shifted 
subsequently toward acquiescence as the Sunni insurgency against 
Assad’s government turned more extreme and jihadist.  
 
Part of the US motivation in the Iran-Contra episode was to establish and 
deepen contacts with the more pragmatic-minded element in the Iranian 
system, associated with Rafsanjani, with the expectation that it would be 
this element that would be dominant in Iran after Khomeini’s death. After 
Khomeini died in June 1989, less than a year after the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Iranian system underwent a convulsion. Changes were made to 
the constitution (these had been begun while Khomeini was still alive), 
Ali Khamenei became Leader in Khomeini’s place, and Rafsanjani 
became President.  Rafsanjani was very much the mastermind behind 
these developments, carrying out what he claimed to have been 
Khomeini’s wishes, and initially he was politically dominant; probably 
the most powerful President there has been under the Islamic republic. He 
was committed to post-war reconstruction, and to a new, pragmatic 
approach in foreign policy (the two were connected – a prime motivation 
was to secure inward investment and access to western technological 
expertise – especially for the oil industry, the infrastructure of which had 
deteriorated badly over the war period) - expressed here in a speech in 
1991 –  
 
The Islamic Republic now needs a prudent policy more than it needs 
anything else … we need a prudent policy, both for inside the country, in 
order to strengthen our base, and for our foreign policy, so that we can 
have a presence and help people without being accused of engaging in 
terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. We have no need 
to speak fanatically. We have no need to chant impractical slogans. We 
do not need to say things which are not acted upon, needlessly 
frightening people and blocking our own path.
10
 
 
But Rafsanjani made only limited headway with his change of policy. 
Other countries were sceptical that Iran really had changed its position. 
There were political, personal and institutional reasons for this in the US 
in particular
11
, but there were more direct and overt reasons also.  One 
was the Rushdie affair; a classic piece of revolutionary policy, 
reminiscent in many ways of the hostage crisis of 1979-81, which may 
have been pursued by Khomeini in his last months deliberately in order to 
ensure continuing adherence to revolutionary principles (and to prevent 
rapprochement with the West) after his death. If so, it was remarkably 
effective; its shadow over Iran’s foreign relations was not lifted until 
1998. In addition, there were a series of terrorist incidents in the early 
1990s with more or less clear connections back to the Iranian regime. Set 
against this, the Iranian government hoped that its efforts to secure the 
release of the last hostages in the Lebanon (achieved by mid-1992) would 
yield benefits in their dealings with the West. But no – the US in 
particular took the view that Iran could not benefit from ending an abuse 
that it should never have encouraged in the first place. 
 
The interplay between revolutionary and pragmatic principles was 
apparent through the first two decades of the Islamic Republic.  At its 
simplest, one could characterize this as a conflict within the system, over 
whether it should, for the benefit of the country, have conventional 
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diplomatic dealings with the wider world (and especially the US and 
other Western nations) or whether such dealings were inherently 
subversive of revolutionary principles. That conflict corresponds largely 
to the internal conflict between democratic and Islamic elements in the 
constitution, and is still unresolved. In Rafsanjani’s time the Foreign 
Ministry became the natural home of the pragmatic principle; sometimes 
at loggerheads within the system against the Revolutionary Guards Corps 
and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, who tended to advocate a 
more trenchant, ideological, revolutionary line. Suspicion of the Foreign 
Ministry for being insufficiently attached to Iran’s revolutionary mission 
was part of the justification for Ahmadinejad’s removal of Iran’s 
ambassadors to Western Europe at the beginning of his Presidency in 
2005. But one should not over-emphasise division and factionalism in 
this context – since 1989 foreign and security policy has been tightly 
coordinated within the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC); 
chaired by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, within which all the main 
organs of state are represented.
12
 
 
But another, separate principle has also been involved in this already 
complex interplay, and arguably has grown in influence over time – the 
principle of nationalism. Perhaps it is necessary first to justify inclusion 
of this third principle. Nationalism was after all part of the ideological 
apparatus of the revolution – should it not be regarded just as a part, an 
aspect of the revolutionary principle we have already explored?  The 
point is that nationalism has affected foreign policy in ways that are 
observably distinct, not directly related to the ideology or the rhetoric of 
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the regime, with roots in popular political attitudes unrelated to the appeal 
(or lack of appeal) of revolutionary ideology. One could think of it as an 
ideological motive that goes beyond pragmatism and the calculation of 
interests, that could be expected to motivate Iran even if it were not an 
Islamic republic.
13
 
 
One example of this is related to the perceived threat from separatist 
groups. The nascent Islamic republic was quick to repress burgeoning 
separatist movements in Kurdestan, Khuzestan, Baluchestan and among 
the Turkmen of the north-east in the years 1979-81 (and after), showing a 
degree of nationalist chauvinism and disregard of declared revolutionary 
principles in so doing. One would expect Iran to be on friendly terms 
with the new state of Azerbaijan (formerly the Soviet republic of 
Azerbaijan), as a predominantly Shi‘a Muslim state on Iran’s North-
Western border. But because Azerbaijan, especially under its first elected 
prime minister after independence, Abulfazl Elcibey (a historian), 
declared its aspiration toward unification with the Iranian province of 
Azerbaijan (of which Tabriz is the capital) to create a greater Azerbaijan, 
and is suspected by Iranians of encouraging occasional outbreaks of 
Azeri separatism within Iran, relations between the two countries have 
often been poor. Iran supported the Christian-dominated Republic of 
Armenia in its dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and in 
other matters too. Azerbaijan has developed links and agreements with 
Israel in response.
14
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 Preservation of national borders can reasonably be, and often would be 
taken as a state interest, and therefore this example might also be thought 
to be governed by the other of my first two principles, the pragmatic one. 
There may be an element of that, but it seems that the response to 
perceived separatist movements indicates more than just state pragmatism 
at work. It often includes an assumption (justified or not) that the 
movements are instigated or helped by third parties – an assumption 
derived from or at least influenced by a nationalist reading of Iran’s 
history.  
 
The Islamic republic’s rhetoric of resistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
war could be presented as a further example. The regime used Islam to 
motivate troops and the general populace, and contrariwise, used the war 
to help cement the regime’s Islamic basis. But as the war went on the 
regime’s leaders increasingly appealed to popular nationalism; including 
by using pre-Islamic national motifs, of the Achaemenid and Sassanid 
empires, for example, in ways reminiscent of their use in the time of the 
Shah.
15
 
 
Another example of the importance of nationalism is the one that has 
become so central over the last decade - that of the nuclear programme. 
Leaving aside the question of the real or declared or suspected purposes 
of the programme, whether it is aimed at the production of a nuclear 
weapon or (as the Iranian government have always claimed) is aimed 
solely at the creation of a civil nuclear industry for the generation of 
electricity, it is plain enough that the policy is linked to a nationalist, 
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populist political motivation.  This is most evident in the argument from 
the regime that the nuclear programme is part of Iran’s right as sovereign 
nation to the legitimate exploitation of her own natural resources, and that 
attempts to limit or obstruct it are (again, rightly or wrongly) down to the 
nefarious actions of Iran’s traditional enemies. This argument (especially 
the natural resources element) has special resonance in Iran because of 
the memory of the premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq, when British 
and US secret services instigated a coup
16
 in order to remove a prime 
minister who had had the temerity to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. 
Mosaddeq enjoyed huge nationalist support from ordinary Iranians. The 
history of the Mosaddeq episode is so present in the memory of Iranians 
that reference to it does not have to be signalled by use of his name; 
phrases like ‘national rights’ and ‘natural resources’ are sufficient.  
Support for Iran’s nuclear policy appears to have been strong among 
ordinary Iranians, though there have been dissenting voices,
17
 and 
increasing pressure on the economy and living standards from sanctions 
2011-14 may have had a contrary effect. Striking evidence for the 
nationalist instrumentality of the nuclear question came in the autumn of 
2009, in the tense period of confrontation after the disputed Presidential 
elections of June 2009, when the reformist Mir Hosein Mousavi, 
Ahmadinejad’s prime opponent in the elections, criticized Ahmadinejad 
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for selling out Iran’s national interests when he appeared to signal the 
possibility of a compromise with the West on the nuclear question.
18
 
 
Revolutionary, Pragmatic, Nationalist – all three principles have been at 
work in Iran’s foreign policy. Often two have been at work at the same 
time. If one accepts that Iran has at least been seeking a potential nuclear 
weapon capability (ie the ability to produce a weapon at short notice in a 
security crisis, such as an invasion) then it is immediately apparent that 
the policy has a large pragmatic element, as a deterrent against 
aggression, as well as the nationalist element already discussed. 
Geography and history (especially the experience of the Iran-Iraq war) 
would be in themselves a sufficient explanation for a desire for an Iranian 
nuclear deterrent in some form. I would suggest that, notwithstanding the 
renewal of revolutionary rhetoric in the time of Ahmadinejad, the 
pragmatic principle has in fact been the predominant one in Iran’s foreign 
policy for most of the period of the Islamic republic, with the partial 
exception of the earliest years, 1979-1984. 
 
One position set against this is the so-called Shi‘a Crescent theory, which 
claimed in the early years of the new millennium that Iran was attempting 
to foment an arc of instability in the Middle East, manipulating Shi‘a 
minorities in the region from Lebanon to the eastern provinces of Saudi 
Arabia. The theory, brought forward first by king Abdullah of Jordan, 
and taken up by others like Hosni Mubarak, Tony Blair and various 
politicians from the Sunni elites of the states along the southern shore of 
the Persian Gulf, pointed to Iran as a threat to the region, aimed at 
exporting revolution and creating an Iranian hegemony. This article 
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cannot be devoted to debunking the theory, but it is hardly necessary to 
do so, because it has by now, thankfully, been widely accepted to be 
bunk.
19
 In reality, although Iranian clerics have an influence beyond Iran, 
it is seldom if ever a controlling influence, and each Shi‘a community 
outside Iran has, unsurprisingly, and without exception, its own separate 
political dynamic, which has much more to do with particular local 
conditions (often oppressive). The relationship between Iran and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon is closer, but even there it is not the case that Iran 
is the master and Hezbollah the servant.  
 
The exaggeration of the threat from Iran according to the Shi‘a crescent 
notion served as an alibi for its proponents, in a variety of ways.  Blaming 
Iran for unrest among Shi‘a Muslims and others in the region distracted 
from the failure of Sunni elites to give properly representative institutions 
to ordinary people, of whatever sect or group, in their own countries; and 
from the fact that most of the terrorism originating from the Middle East 
was inspired and perpetrated by Sunnis, not Shi‘as. For Western leaders 
like George W Bush and Tony Blair, blaming Iran in 2005-7 for their 
difficulties in Iraq distracted from the political and military mistakes they 
themselves (and their subordinates, under their direction) had made, and 
again, from the extent of funding from Saudi origins for the Sunni 
insurgency that was their main problem. The inflammatory and 
confrontational rhetoric of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and others that was 
current at the time made it easier to put Iran in the role of scapegoat. 
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In the first decade of the new millennium Iran’s position in the Middle 
East was undoubtedly strengthened; primarily by the removal of two 
neighbouring hostile regimes - that of Saddam Husein in Iraq, and that of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan.  But in both cases those regimes were 
removed by US-led coalitions, not by the Iranians. It was misleading or 
foolish or both to attribute Iran’s stronger position to an expansionist or 
hegemonic policy. Iran does not have the force levels or the military 
spending for such a policy,
20
 and any idea that Iran might try to use a 
nuclear capability as a short cut to hegemony ignores the history of 
nuclear weapons since the 1950s, which is that they have been effective 
only as a deterrent. Any projected analysis of a possible case in which 
they might be used by Iran in such a way is impossible to sustain. First 
use of a nuclear weapon by Iran would bring down an overwhelming 
nuclear response by the United States or Israel, or possibly both; that is so 
clear as to render ineffectual any idea of aggressive threat of use of a 
nuclear weapon by Iran.  
 
More recently, since the Arab spring, emphasis has shifted somewhat to 
the danger of sectarian conflict in the Middle East. This debate has been 
more balanced, but initially showed a tendency to see Iran and Shi‘ism as 
a threat in familiar terms
21. With serious negotiations on Iran’s nuclear 
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programme in the background, criticism of Iran was nonetheless more 
muted than previously, and there was a rather greater awareness of the 
much greater danger of instability in the region induced by Sunni 
extremism funded by elements within Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-led 
states. This new perspective was massively confirmed by the fall of 
Mosul to ISIS forces in June 2014. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps 
advisers found themselves in an unlikely position as de facto US allies 
against the advancing Sunni extremists.  US policy against the Assad 
regime in Syria had already realigned itself in recognition of the greater 
danger there from ISIS. Previous Saudi policy of backing such groups 
was also forced to adjust; signalled by the removal from office of Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan in April 2014. 
 
Iranian foreign policy has been a sometimes confusing mix of 
pragmatism and ideology; but a cool view of it shows the tendency for 
pragmatism to dominate, and all the more so the closer one comes to 
Iran’s own borders. This is shown in Iranian policy toward Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In both countries Iran supported groups opposed to the 
previous regimes for years (SCIRI in Iraq and the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan) and continued to back their leaders when those leaders took 
power with Western support after the US-led invasions brought down the 
Taliban in 2001 and Saddam in 2003. In both countries allegations of 
Iranian support (through the Qods force) for insurgents fighting Western 
troops in those countries (and opposed to the Karzai and Maliki 
governments) have been frequent, but hard to substantiate with solid 
evidence. There was rather better evidence for Iranian activity behind 
                                                                                                                                           
Khalifa regime in Bahrain claiming that the unrest against them has been driven by 
Iran have been unconvincing. Given the scale of support for the Shi‘a opposition in 
the country, and the brutality with which they have been treated, Iranian policy has 
been remarkably restrained (and pragmatic) 
groups acting against the British before their withdrawal from Basra in 
2007.
22
 Despite this, Iranian support for stability and for the 
democratically-elected governments supported also by the West has been 
declared and consistent – as well as being plainly in Iran’s best interests. 
At points it has been suggested that the Iranians were too blinkered and 
too partisan in a sectarian sense in their support for Maliki in Iraq. If so, 
there was a congruence with the Western support for Maliki, albeit for 
other reasons,
23
 but by August 2014 it seems the Iranian regime 
pragmatically recognized the need for an Iraqi leader with a broader base 
of support. An Iranian official was reported by Reuters as saying – 
‘We have reached the conclusion that Maliki cannot preserve the unity of  
Iraq anymore … There are not many candidates who … have the 
capability to preserve unity of Iraq [sic]. Our ambassador to Iraq has had 
some meetings in the past days with relevant groups and some of the 
candidates,’24 
 
The regime of the Islamic republic is autocratic, often oppressive. It 
frequently denies its citizens essential rights, and has evolved to serve the 
interests of a restricted ruling clique. Motivated by ideology, paranoia or 
other motives it has instigated or perpetrated unacceptable actions beyond 
its borders as well as within them. There is no place for naivety or 
whitewash about the operations of the Iranian regime (though it is 
necessary to say also that there are many regimes in the Middle East that 
are as bad or worse in most or all of these respects). But it is necessary 
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 see discussion in Axworthy 2013, pp 392-3 
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 for this, although it is a personal and rather partisan piece, see the article by Ali 
Khedery in the Washington Post, 3 July 2014, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-we-stuck-with-maliki--and-lost-
iraq/2014/07/03/0dd6a8a4-f7ec-11e3-a606-946fd632f9f1_story.html - accessed 8 July 
2014 
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 http://www.gulfinthemedia.com/index.php?id=711549&news_type=Top&lang=en 
- accessed 6 August 2014 
not to veer in the other direction, as has often happened, to see Iran as 
more dangerous, more threatening and more incorrigible than she really 
is. A calm, objective assessment is specially necessary at a time of 
possible change, as appears at the time of writing to be on offer from the 
government of President Rouhani (protégé, of course, of the arch-
pragmatist Rafsanjani).   
 
Particularly significant for this, perhaps, within the terms of this article, 
has been Iran’s support for democratic political structures in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Iran was instrumental in persuading the Northern Alliance 
to agree to these structures at the Petersberg conference at the end of 
2001
25
, and was helpful in a similar direction in Iraq in 2003. Pragmatic, 
or revolutionary? We should not forget that the revolution of 1979 set up 
a constitution that included a large democratic element in Iran. Most 
analysts would have major reservations about the way that democracy has 
functioned since then, but there have been regular elections, and they 
have changed governments. Whatever the success or failure of 
democracy within Iran, a commitment to at least a form of democracy is 
part of the ideology of the state:
 26
 that connects through to foreign policy, 
and has been a significant factor in Iran’s position toward Iraq and 
Afghanistan. We should not regard Iran’s revolutionary principle as 
necessarily inimical to the West in all aspects – not necessarily 
isolationist and extreme. If, as now seems possible, there is to be a 
realignment of Iran’s position in the world, building upon a hoped-for 
success in the nuclear negotiations, this is perhaps, along with the many 
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 Slavin, Barbara Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US and the Twisted Path 
to Confrontation, New York 2007 pp 197-9; see also the report from James Dobbins 
(leader of the US delegation to the talks in Bonn) in the Washington Post, 22 July 
2007 
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 Hooman Majd’s important book The Ayatollahs’ Democracy (New York 2010) is 
an important reminder of this aspect of modern Iran  
convergences of interest between Iran and the West, something to build 
on. 
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 Another precedent that gives some cause for optimism is the so-called Grand 
Bargain offer of 2003, in which the Iranians offered, inter alia, a de facto recognition 
of Israel (see Axworthy 2013, pp 359-361) 
